"It's Justice, But Not as We Know It, Jim"

When Public Justice is Pathetic

Over recent days a very interesting case has hit the headlines. A high profile sports broadcaster several years ago was ending a relationship with a woman who was the marketing manager for a large corporate. In the midst of a stormy argument, the broadcaster assaulted her physically in some way (details have not been disclosed). The former couple resolved the dispute. The resolution included the payment of $170,000 to the assaulted female. Nothing was disclosed in public. Both parties went their separate ways.

Recently, several years later, the incident and the payment of money has come to light. The sports broadcaster has been roundly and soundly condemned by everyone who has spoken up on the matter. Apart from the wrong of physically assaulting another person, and in particular, a man assaulting a woman who is the weaker vessel, criticism has focused upon other “transgressions”.

Most have expressed moral distaste and repugnance that the woman was “bought off”, that her silence was “purchased.” This we will call the pathetically puerile condemnation.

Others have condemned the failure to have the assault brought before the courts, and the offending broadcaster jailed. This we will call the arrogantly unjust argument.

First, the pathetically puerile argument that the woman was “bought off.” It's instructive how emotive and irrational public media has become. Let's just change the language and see what happens. Let's use the words “compensation” and “restitution” and “victims' rights.” Here is a wonderful case of justice being done in the private sphere—in a manner and result far superior to the kind of pseudo-justice that obtains in the public sphere.

From what we know, both parties chose to resolve the situation privately. The broadcaster admitted his sinful actions. The two therefore worked out a way of compensating the victim in a way that was acceptable to her. She was reportedly restituted for hurt and humiliation, pain, and forgone earnings while recouperating. Was justice done? Absolutely. Was it constructive, helpful justice? Apparently, for both parties have moved on and are living productive lives. Was the victim left angry, hurt, bitter, non-restored, depressed, on medication? Apparently not. She continues in a successful career. Did it restore the offender? Clearly, yes. Did the victim receive far more compensation and restitution than she would ever have been granted in the public justice system? Without question.

One would have thought that this was the kind of outcome the justice system and Athenian society craves, but seldom gets. But now we find out that when Athens does get a wonderful example of the kind of justice it says it wants, it reviles and vilifies the parties. We believe this is childish petulance of the worst kind. It calls for a thorough smack on the collective rear end.

Finally, before we turn to the “arrogantly unjust” argument, we cannot pass on without noting the supreme arrogant condescension displayed in this puerile criticism towards the victim. A criticism which we believe to be implicitly sexist. She is implicitly portrayed as venal, carnal, weak, easily manipulated, cheap, easily bought off—one could go on—but nowhere is she respected as a human being making responsible choices that truly reflected her own preferences. “Oh no—we, the great public chattering classes of Athens' narrow fetid streets, we know better. We know her true interests better than she does. We know what's best for her, and we are going to make sure that she humbles herself and submits herself before us, so that she can receive from our superior hand.”

The “arrogantly unjust” argument is slightly different. It approaches the whole event not from the concern for justice, but for the driving needs of propaganda. There are those who have opined that violence is a huge problem in our society and zero tolerance must be shown. Showing zero tolerance requires that all cases must be duly prosecuted and the the guilty punished in the public square.

In this argument justice is reduced to being a mere function of perceived public behavioural impact. Therefore the private agreement has to be rejected as inherently unjust—for justice is all about public impact and propaganda. The “arrogantly unjust” argument makes justice irrelevant and unimportant. Thus it is unjust because, at least in cases of violence, justice is of little concern. It is arrogant because it believes that society can be molded and shaped by such stratagems.

What will be the outcome of this latest paroxysm of indignant outrage, of Athenian foam dribbling down the collective chin? It is hard to predict—but high on the cards must be the two individuals concerned leaving New Zealand for countries less banal, less benighted, less arrogant, and less unjust.