2020 Election Will Be a Contest of the Angry
It is no longer really about Biden and Trump
Victor Davis Hanson
National Review Online
The old 2020 election was supposed to be about many familiar issues. It is not anymore.
Up until now, the candidates themselves would supposedly be the story in November. The Left had cited Trump’s tweets and erratic firings as windows into his dark soul.
The Right had replied that an addled and befuddled Joe Biden was not really a candidate at all. Instead, he was a mere facsimile who would have to be carried to the Election Day on the shoulders of the Democratic Party, only shortly to fade away. Then a radical vice president soon could implement a hard-left agenda by succession what she could not through election.
Issues themselves are no longer likely to decide the election either. Not long ago progressives argued that the miracle Trump economy was in shambles, done in by plague, quarantine, and riot. They thundered that it was what you would expect from Trump’s innate chaos — a mess that would have to be invented if it had not existed.
The Right had countered that deregulation, energy development, tax reform, and reindustrialization that made America Great would make American Great Again.
For all of 2019 and 2020, Democrats had claimed that a calm abroad would return with a Biden win. They talked of reestablishing the influence of post-war American-led diplomacy, soft power, traditional alliances, transnational organizations, and the United Nations.
Trump Republicans believed all that was more the problem, not the solution. They argued that America’s relationships with NATO, China, and the European Union were now at least founded on reality, not dangerous fantasies and stale bromides.
Trump opponents saw the November election as a return to Washington normality: no more fights with the press, no more paranoia of a deep state, no more dissident generals, canned FBI leaders, or exasperated CIA officials.
Trump’s base instead had seen the November election as the last chance to drain the federal swamp of careerists, apparatchiks, corporate flunkies, and various grifters. These unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats, lobbyists, and revolving-door functionaries over the prior decades had hacked at the Bill of Rights, stagnated the economy, mired the nation in endless winless wars, and mortgaged the country to China.
But that conundrum is ancient history now.
Showing posts with label Trump Doctrine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trump Doctrine. Show all posts
Thursday, 2 July 2020
Wednesday, 5 February 2020
No "Human Right" To Abortion
Trump Builds International Anti-Abortion Coalition
Stefano Gennarini, J.D.
WASHINGTON D.C., January 24 (C-Fam) Last week, the Trump administration hosted an international strategy meeting for ambassadors, ministers, and other government officials to discuss a way forward for the pro-life cause internationally.
“I stated this fact at the United Nations this past September, and I’ll repeat it here: there is no international human right to abortion. On the other hand, there is an international human right to life,” U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar said in remarks during a gathering at Blair House. The meeting was attended by representatives of 34 countries representing 1.7 billion people.
“President Trump has been clear, at the U.N. and on the world stage: Health care exists to improve health and preserve human life,” Azar emphasized. He thanked the countries for their help in promoting a positive vision for women’s health, protecting the lives of the most vulnerable, defending the important role of the family, and parents in particular, in the health and well-being of their children, and promoting respect national sovereignty.
Azar described the group of countries at the gathering as a “pro-life, pro-family, pro-sovereignty coalition that is a force to be reckoned with” and invited countries to help grow the coalition. “We cannot stand still, because we have much work to do in 2020 and beyond,” Azar said.
Stefano Gennarini, J.D.
WASHINGTON D.C., January 24 (C-Fam) Last week, the Trump administration hosted an international strategy meeting for ambassadors, ministers, and other government officials to discuss a way forward for the pro-life cause internationally.
“I stated this fact at the United Nations this past September, and I’ll repeat it here: there is no international human right to abortion. On the other hand, there is an international human right to life,” U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar said in remarks during a gathering at Blair House. The meeting was attended by representatives of 34 countries representing 1.7 billion people.
“President Trump has been clear, at the U.N. and on the world stage: Health care exists to improve health and preserve human life,” Azar emphasized. He thanked the countries for their help in promoting a positive vision for women’s health, protecting the lives of the most vulnerable, defending the important role of the family, and parents in particular, in the health and well-being of their children, and promoting respect national sovereignty.
Azar described the group of countries at the gathering as a “pro-life, pro-family, pro-sovereignty coalition that is a force to be reckoned with” and invited countries to help grow the coalition. “We cannot stand still, because we have much work to do in 2020 and beyond,” Azar said.
Labels:
Abortion,
Trump Doctrine,
United Nations
Wednesday, 15 January 2020
Donald Trump, The Jacksonian President
Iranian Analytics
By Victor Davis Hanson
National Review Online
For all the current furor over the death of Qasem Soleimani, it is Iran, not the U.S. and the Trump administration, that is in a dilemma. Given the death and destruction wrought by Soleimani, and his agendas to come, he will not be missed.
Tehran has misjudged the U.S. administration’s doctrine of strategic realism rather than vice versa. The theocracy apparently calculated that prior U.S. patience and restraint in the face of its aggression was proof of an unwillingness or inability to respond. More likely, the administration was earlier prepping for a possible more dramatic, deadly, and politically justifiable response when and if Iran soon overreached.
To retain domestic and foreign credibility, Iran would now like to escalate in hopes of creating some sort of U.S. quagmire comparable to Afghanistan, or, more germanely, to a long Serbian-like bombing campaign mess, or the ennui that eventually overtook the endless no-fly zones over Iraq, or the creepy misadventure in Libya, or even something like an enervating 1979-80 hostage situation. The history of the strategies of our Middle East opponents has always been to lure us into situations that have no strategic endgame, do not play to U.S. strengths in firepower, are costly without a time limit, and create Vietnam War–like tensions at home.
But those wished-for landscapes are not what Iran has got itself into.
By Victor Davis Hanson
National Review Online
For all the current furor over the death of Qasem Soleimani, it is Iran, not the U.S. and the Trump administration, that is in a dilemma. Given the death and destruction wrought by Soleimani, and his agendas to come, he will not be missed.
Tehran has misjudged the U.S. administration’s doctrine of strategic realism rather than vice versa. The theocracy apparently calculated that prior U.S. patience and restraint in the face of its aggression was proof of an unwillingness or inability to respond. More likely, the administration was earlier prepping for a possible more dramatic, deadly, and politically justifiable response when and if Iran soon overreached.
To retain domestic and foreign credibility, Iran would now like to escalate in hopes of creating some sort of U.S. quagmire comparable to Afghanistan, or, more germanely, to a long Serbian-like bombing campaign mess, or the ennui that eventually overtook the endless no-fly zones over Iraq, or the creepy misadventure in Libya, or even something like an enervating 1979-80 hostage situation. The history of the strategies of our Middle East opponents has always been to lure us into situations that have no strategic endgame, do not play to U.S. strengths in firepower, are costly without a time limit, and create Vietnam War–like tensions at home.
But those wished-for landscapes are not what Iran has got itself into.
Labels:
Andrew Jackson,
Trump Doctrine,
Trump Wars
Monday, 13 January 2020
David French's Letter From America
Iraq: The More You Know, the Worse You Feel.
The French Press
I’m not going to rehash all the events of the last few days in Iraq. The short version is relatively simple—after an escalating series of attacks on American bases (including an attack that killed an American contractor), the United States responded with a series of air strikes against Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria that killed more than two dozen militants. Earlier this week, these militias responded by besieging the American Embassy in Baghdad, the U.S. reinforced its defenses, and the militias have withdrawn. For the moment, the immediate crisis seems to have passed. So, what should we make of the week’s events?
First, don’t tell Twitter, but this was no Benghazi. In Libya, an outmanned, outgunned detachment of American diplomats and intelligence officers faced a sustained, organized assault from jihadist militias without meaningful assistance. The diplomatic outpost was overrun, a CIA facility was abandoned, and we lost four American lives, including the life of the American ambassador. It was a terrible defeat, and only extraordinary American heroism kept it from becoming a massacre.
By contrast, the American Embassy in Baghdad did not fall, and an American show of force (including Apache helicopters over the embassy and rapid Marine reinforcements) demonstrated to the Iraqi militants that the U.S. would defend its diplomats. There was no American defeat. The embassy still stands.
Second, the protests were no “grassroots uprising.”
The French Press
I’m not going to rehash all the events of the last few days in Iraq. The short version is relatively simple—after an escalating series of attacks on American bases (including an attack that killed an American contractor), the United States responded with a series of air strikes against Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria that killed more than two dozen militants. Earlier this week, these militias responded by besieging the American Embassy in Baghdad, the U.S. reinforced its defenses, and the militias have withdrawn. For the moment, the immediate crisis seems to have passed. So, what should we make of the week’s events?
First, don’t tell Twitter, but this was no Benghazi. In Libya, an outmanned, outgunned detachment of American diplomats and intelligence officers faced a sustained, organized assault from jihadist militias without meaningful assistance. The diplomatic outpost was overrun, a CIA facility was abandoned, and we lost four American lives, including the life of the American ambassador. It was a terrible defeat, and only extraordinary American heroism kept it from becoming a massacre.
By contrast, the American Embassy in Baghdad did not fall, and an American show of force (including Apache helicopters over the embassy and rapid Marine reinforcements) demonstrated to the Iraqi militants that the U.S. would defend its diplomats. There was no American defeat. The embassy still stands.
Second, the protests were no “grassroots uprising.”
Saturday, 11 January 2020
David French's Letter From America
Trump’s Bold, Justified Gamble In Killing Soleimani Just Might Pay Off
David French
Under this scenario, Iran doesn’t end its enmity and opposition to the U.S., but it does at least temporarily de-escalate. There is some historical precedent for this hope. After the Reagan administration’s sank several ships in the Iranian navy in Operation Praying Mantis in 1988, Iran reduced attacks on neutral shipping in the gulf, providing the United States with a temporary victory. If Iran does stand down its escalations, even if only for a time, Trump’s gamble will have paid off. The strike on Suleimani will have deterred Iran more than it provoked Iran.
But don’t think a pause – or even a de-escalation – means peace. After Praying Mantis, Iran continued to aid anti-American terrorists, and in 1996 it struck America again, bombing the Khobar Towers military complex in Saudi Arabia and killing 19 American service members.
A pause is possible, but it’s optimistic to call it likely. Iran could well respond to Trump’s gamble with a gamble of its own – hitting back, hard, at America or its allies to take advantage of relative American military weakness and profound American division in the hopes of consolidating support at home and pushing the American people past the point of tolerating yet another Middle East conflict.
David French
Under this scenario, Iran doesn’t end its enmity and opposition to the U.S., but it does at least temporarily de-escalate. There is some historical precedent for this hope. After the Reagan administration’s sank several ships in the Iranian navy in Operation Praying Mantis in 1988, Iran reduced attacks on neutral shipping in the gulf, providing the United States with a temporary victory. If Iran does stand down its escalations, even if only for a time, Trump’s gamble will have paid off. The strike on Suleimani will have deterred Iran more than it provoked Iran.
But don’t think a pause – or even a de-escalation – means peace. After Praying Mantis, Iran continued to aid anti-American terrorists, and in 1996 it struck America again, bombing the Khobar Towers military complex in Saudi Arabia and killing 19 American service members.
A pause is possible, but it’s optimistic to call it likely. Iran could well respond to Trump’s gamble with a gamble of its own – hitting back, hard, at America or its allies to take advantage of relative American military weakness and profound American division in the hopes of consolidating support at home and pushing the American people past the point of tolerating yet another Middle East conflict.
Friday, 10 January 2020
Trump Doctrine Becomes a More Clear
Iranian Analytics
Victor Davis Hanson
National Review Online
For all the current furor over the death of Qasem Soleimani, it is Iran, not the U.S. and the Trump administration, that is in a dilemma. Given the death and destruction wrought by Soleimani, and his agendas to come, he will not be missed.
Tehran has misjudged the U.S. administration’s doctrine of strategic realism rather than vice versa. The theocracy apparently calculated that prior U.S. patience and restraint in the face of its aggression was proof of an unwillingness or inability to respond. More likely, the administration was earlier prepping for a possible more dramatic, deadly, and politically justifiable response when and if Iran soon overreached.
To retain domestic and foreign credibility, Iran would now like to escalate in hopes of creating some sort of U.S. quagmire comparable to Afghanistan, or, more germanely, to a long Serbian-like bombing campaign mess, or the ennui that eventually overtook the endless no-fly zones over Iraq, or the creepy misadventure in Libya, or even something like an enervating 1979-80 hostage situation. The history of the strategies of our Middle East opponents has always been to lure us into situations that have no strategic endgame, do not play to U.S. strengths in firepower, are costly without a time limit, and create Vietnam War–like tensions at home.
But those wished-for landscapes are not what Iran has got itself into. Trump, after showing patience and restraint to prior Iranian escalations, can respond to Iranian tit-for-tat without getting near Iran, without commitments to any formal campaign, and without seeming to be a provocateur itching for war, but in theory doing a lot more damage to an already damaged Iranian economy either through drones, missiles, and bombing, or even more sanctions and boycotts to come. If Iran turns to terrorism and cyber-attacks, it would likely only lose more political support and risk airborne responses to its infrastructure at home.
Iran deeply erred in thinking that Trump’s restraint was permanent, that his impeachment meant he had lost political viability, that he would go dormant in an election year, that the stature of his left-wing opponents would surge in such tensions, and that his base would abandon him if he dared to use military force.
Victor Davis Hanson
National Review Online
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Tehran has misjudged the U.S. administration’s doctrine of strategic realism rather than vice versa. The theocracy apparently calculated that prior U.S. patience and restraint in the face of its aggression was proof of an unwillingness or inability to respond. More likely, the administration was earlier prepping for a possible more dramatic, deadly, and politically justifiable response when and if Iran soon overreached.
To retain domestic and foreign credibility, Iran would now like to escalate in hopes of creating some sort of U.S. quagmire comparable to Afghanistan, or, more germanely, to a long Serbian-like bombing campaign mess, or the ennui that eventually overtook the endless no-fly zones over Iraq, or the creepy misadventure in Libya, or even something like an enervating 1979-80 hostage situation. The history of the strategies of our Middle East opponents has always been to lure us into situations that have no strategic endgame, do not play to U.S. strengths in firepower, are costly without a time limit, and create Vietnam War–like tensions at home.
But those wished-for landscapes are not what Iran has got itself into. Trump, after showing patience and restraint to prior Iranian escalations, can respond to Iranian tit-for-tat without getting near Iran, without commitments to any formal campaign, and without seeming to be a provocateur itching for war, but in theory doing a lot more damage to an already damaged Iranian economy either through drones, missiles, and bombing, or even more sanctions and boycotts to come. If Iran turns to terrorism and cyber-attacks, it would likely only lose more political support and risk airborne responses to its infrastructure at home.
Iran deeply erred in thinking that Trump’s restraint was permanent, that his impeachment meant he had lost political viability, that he would go dormant in an election year, that the stature of his left-wing opponents would surge in such tensions, and that his base would abandon him if he dared to use military force.
Wednesday, 8 January 2020
Trump's Doctrines of War
Interesting Times
The powers that be within Iran are right now between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand the clerics and Islamists in that country are losing support from ordinary Iranian citizens by the day. The only way they can control the restless population is by murder on a grand scale. Secondly, the United States has demonstrated that it will protect the interests of the US whenever and wherever Iran attempts to do damage to the US.
We find ourselves intrigued by Trump's doctrines of war. For a long time he has declared that he wants US military personnel and weaponry brought home. He wants to turn away from the US being the military policeman of the globe and replace it with a military that is far more narrowly focused upon defending essential US interests. To this end he has declared he wants to see much of the US military repatriated back to the US. Secondly, he has made himself obnoxious to some by demanding that allies of the US begin to contribute to their national and international obligations, instead of expecting the US to stump up and pay their defense and western military alliance costs.
But Trump has also demonstrated that he is not a pacifist--not by a long shot.
The powers that be within Iran are right now between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand the clerics and Islamists in that country are losing support from ordinary Iranian citizens by the day. The only way they can control the restless population is by murder on a grand scale. Secondly, the United States has demonstrated that it will protect the interests of the US whenever and wherever Iran attempts to do damage to the US.
We find ourselves intrigued by Trump's doctrines of war. For a long time he has declared that he wants US military personnel and weaponry brought home. He wants to turn away from the US being the military policeman of the globe and replace it with a military that is far more narrowly focused upon defending essential US interests. To this end he has declared he wants to see much of the US military repatriated back to the US. Secondly, he has made himself obnoxious to some by demanding that allies of the US begin to contribute to their national and international obligations, instead of expecting the US to stump up and pay their defense and western military alliance costs.
But Trump has also demonstrated that he is not a pacifist--not by a long shot.
Labels:
Iran,
Middle East,
Trump Doctrine,
Trump's Wars,
US Military
Tuesday, 26 November 2019
The US President Is Still Breathing
Victor Davis Hanson's "Take" On the Trump Presidency
What was the upshot of the animus toward Trump I’ve catalogued in this series? In the first two years of his presidency, Trump has not resigned. He has not been impeached. He has not been indicted. He has not died or been declared non compos mentis. Trump did not govern as a liberal, as some of his Never Trump critics predicted. He had not been driven to seclusion by lurid exposés of his past womanizing a decade earlier as a Manhattan television celebrity. Predictions of all that and more were no more accurate than earlier prognostications that Trump would never be nominated and certainly never elected.
An administrative state, swamp, deep state, call it what you wish, was wrong about Trump’s nomination, his election, and his governance.
What was the upshot of the animus toward Trump I’ve catalogued in this series? In the first two years of his presidency, Trump has not resigned. He has not been impeached. He has not been indicted. He has not died or been declared non compos mentis. Trump did not govern as a liberal, as some of his Never Trump critics predicted. He had not been driven to seclusion by lurid exposés of his past womanizing a decade earlier as a Manhattan television celebrity. Predictions of all that and more were no more accurate than earlier prognostications that Trump would never be nominated and certainly never elected.
An administrative state, swamp, deep state, call it what you wish, was wrong about Trump’s nomination, his election, and his governance.
Monday, 22 July 2019
Effective, Thoughtful, and Merciful Use of Force
Targeted and Limited
One of the features of Trump's military doctrine which stands out in stark contrast to many of his predecessors is its apparent concern for human life.
There, we suggest, is a military doctrine about which we could get pleased, if not excited.
One of the features of Trump's military doctrine which stands out in stark contrast to many of his predecessors is its apparent concern for human life.
A day after Iran shot down the U.S. drone on June 20, Trump approved military strikes on Iran in retaliation — but then abruptly cancelled them. “We were cocked & loaded to retaliate last night on 3 different sights when I asked, how many will die. 150 people, sir, was the answer from a General,” Trump wrote in a tweet on June 21. “10 minutes before the strike I stopped it, not.....proportionate to shooting down an unmanned drone.”So, the response became targeted and limited--focused upon those responsible within Iran and its allies. The reason? To save human life--particularly those who were not responsible. We struggle to recall a similar kind of decision by a sitting US President--although doubtless there are some.
Days later, Trump signed an executive order imposing what he called “hard-hitting” new sanctions on Iran. “We will continue to increase pressure on Tehran until the regime abandons its dangerous activities,” including its nuclear ambitions, Trump said on June 24. The new sanctions denied Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his office access to key financial resources. The sanctions also targeted Iranian military leaders who were responsible for shooting down the drone. [CNBC]
There, we suggest, is a military doctrine about which we could get pleased, if not excited.
Friday, 20 July 2018
Trump's Foreign Policy, Part I
Method in the "Madness"
When it comes to foreign policy, we suspect that Trump will be assessed by history as one of the better US Presidents. It is possible, depending on how things develop, that he will even be rated one of the best.
His predecessor, Barack Obama is rapidly fading into the mists of time. "What did he stand for, again?" many are wondering. We don't think the West will be confused about Trump and what he stood for when it came to US foreign policy.
A couple of recent pieces in NZ media underscore this thesis. Mike Hosking is in no doubt about what Trump stands for when it comes to US foreign policy.
Trump Yet Again Proves He's Up To The Job
Mike Hosking
NZ Herald
If he was an act, and of course many people argue he is, then it would have been called the "tell it like it is" tour. I happened to be watching live as US President Donald Trump arrived to lambaste NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg. Being live, no-one knew what was coming, and it was fantastic to watch.
Labels:
Brexit,
NATO,
Trump Doctrine,
US Foreign Policy
Wednesday, 18 July 2018
More on The "Trump Doctrine"
Reciprocity Is the Method to Trump’s Madness
Victor Davis Hanson
National Review Online
The president sends a signal: Treat us the way we treat you, and keep your commitments.
Critics of Donald Trump claim that there’s no rhyme or reason to his foreign policy. But if there is a consistency, it might be called reciprocity. Trump tries to force other countries to treat the U.S. as the U.S. treats them. In “don’t tread on me” style, he also warns enemies that any aggressive act will be replied to in kind.
The underlying principle of Trump commercial reciprocity is that the United States is no longer powerful or wealthy enough to alone underwrite the security of the West. It can no longer assume sole enforcement of the rules and protocols of the post-war global order.
This year there have been none of the usual Iranian provocations — frequent during the Obama administration — of harassing American ships in the Persian Gulf. Apparently, the Iranians now realize that anything they do to an American ship will be replied to with overwhelming force.
Ditto North Korea. After lots of threats from Kim Jong-un about using his new ballistic missiles against the United States, Trump warned that he would use America’s far greater arsenal to eliminate North Korea’s arsenal for good.
Trump is said to be undermining NATO by questioning its usefulness some 69 years after its founding. Yet this is not 1948, and Germany is no longer down. The United States is always in. And Russia is hardly out but is instead cutting energy deals with the Europeans.
Victor Davis Hanson
National Review Online
The president sends a signal: Treat us the way we treat you, and keep your commitments.
Critics of Donald Trump claim that there’s no rhyme or reason to his foreign policy. But if there is a consistency, it might be called reciprocity. Trump tries to force other countries to treat the U.S. as the U.S. treats them. In “don’t tread on me” style, he also warns enemies that any aggressive act will be replied to in kind.
The underlying principle of Trump commercial reciprocity is that the United States is no longer powerful or wealthy enough to alone underwrite the security of the West. It can no longer assume sole enforcement of the rules and protocols of the post-war global order.
This year there have been none of the usual Iranian provocations — frequent during the Obama administration — of harassing American ships in the Persian Gulf. Apparently, the Iranians now realize that anything they do to an American ship will be replied to with overwhelming force.
Ditto North Korea. After lots of threats from Kim Jong-un about using his new ballistic missiles against the United States, Trump warned that he would use America’s far greater arsenal to eliminate North Korea’s arsenal for good.
Trump is said to be undermining NATO by questioning its usefulness some 69 years after its founding. Yet this is not 1948, and Germany is no longer down. The United States is always in. And Russia is hardly out but is instead cutting energy deals with the Europeans.
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