Principles of War in Culture War
Culture and Politics - Politics
Written by Douglas Wilson
Tuesday, 14 May 2013
Principles that govern every form of conflict are constant in all
possible scenarioes. The need for mobility, surprise, etc. will never
fade away. But weapons and tactics are not constant -- rocks, bows,
guns, triremes, torpedoes, etc. vary from era to era, and war to war.
Electronic countermeasures played no role whatever in the battle of
Lepanto.
Those who are merely competent in the use of a particular weapon are
followers. They may be very competent indeed, but that is not the issue.
They are also essential to success of any campaign, but if they are
promoted to the level where principled strategic thinking is necessary,
they will also be essential to the failure of that campaign.
Those who comprehend the principles involved are effective leaders. I
would go so far as to say that this is one of the fundamental
characteristics of effective leadership.
Who is competent to see the
dividing line between leaders and would-be leaders? Both kinds of people
think they are leaders, but only one truly knows.
In an egalitarian culture, however, true leadership is despised and
precedence is given to technicians, bureaucrats, and various kinds of
intellectual ground pounders. This means things can get fearfully skewed
-- we have generals who do not see the principles involved, and
sergeants who do. The distinction between principles and “methods” is an
objective one. However, to the one who is not gifted to see, the whole
thing will appear to be a Zen exercise.
When the distinctions are observed, the result is military “wisdom.”
But principles do not fight by themselves. Principles are always
incarnate in a particular method. There is therefore always something
there to distract and confuse somebody who isn’t thinking.
Here is a brief list of the principles of war. They were developed on
the field of battle, but they apply to any situation where conflict or
competition is occurring. Reformers are concerned to win what have come
to be called the "culture wars," and unless we recover an understanding
of these principles, and learn to apply them to the conflicts we are in,
then such a win is impossible.
I will briefly list the principles, and then give some commentary on
each one, looking to show how they apply to the cultural struggle we are
in.
1. Objective
2. Offensive
3. Concentration
4. Mobility
5. Security
6. Surprise
7. Cooperation
8. Communication
9. Economy of Force
10. Pursuit
The first principle answers the question -- what are we trying to
achieve? Now of course, there are objectives and subordinate objectives.
For many Reformed types, the phrase “do all to the glory of God” has
assumed mantra-like status. After all, does not the Shorter Catechism
tell us what the chief end of man is? Yes, it does, and it does so
correctly. That is the ultimate objective, and it should be there.
But it is not enough to acknowledge this in a perfunctory way that
affirms the ultimate objective while failing to work toward that
ultimate objective by means of intelligently ascertained subordinate
objectives.
The subordinate objectives should better be identified as nested
within a hierarchy of ascending objectives. Now every principle must be
clothed in a particular method. In the same way, the objective cannot be
pursued simply by acknowledging the rightness of the objective. The
objective must be pursued by particular actions, which must be layered
within an ascending hierarchy of objectives.
Thus, whenever something is done, the objective should relate to the
ultimate reason it was done, while the thing accomplished (with which we
are all pleased) could not justify itself as an ultimate objective. The
clothing of the action does not reveal the objective. One man may be an
activist and another a car mechanic, and share the same objective. Or
two men may both be activists and not share the same objective. These
distinctions cannot be maintained apart from a biblical worldview, and
that worldview absolutely requires that the glory of God be the final
telos of all actions, whether the actions were performed by God or man.
Takeaway point: The objective needs to be clear, and rightly nested
within other, larger objectives. When the bugle blows indistinctly, no
one gets ready for battle.
The second principle of war is that of offensive. These principles of
war are principles of effective fighting, showing us how to engage in
conflict. They are not the same as moral principles. They tell you how
to fight effectively; they do not tell you whether you should be
fighting. The Germans invaded Belgium, and that was taking the
offensive, but that did not make it good. If your cause is good, it is
also good to be observing these principles. If not, then not.
Remember the classic Reformed stance on civil resistance, which
certainly limits how this principle may be employed. Evil authorities
are first to have the word preached to them, and every lawful means of
appeal and resistance should be applied. Secondly, it is permissible to
flee persecution, what Calvin once called getting the heck out of Dodge.
And third, it is permissible to take up arms against a tyrant
defensively. This last shows a principled neglect of this principle of
war. This is what David did when Saul fell into his hands in the cave.
He failed to take the offensive, and because of it God blessed him. In
failing to take one kind of offensive, he took the offensive on another
level entirely.
However, if ethical considerations do not prevent one from taking the
offensive, all thought and energy should be employed either in taking
the offensive, or planning on how to move from defense to offense.
Survival is not the goal, stalemate is not the goal, absence of
collision is not the goal. Except for baseball, which is an odd one, you
can't score points unless you have the ball.
Considered generally, is the Church today in an offensive or
defensive stance? Leave aside the compromised sectors of the church are,
which are actively doing damage in what they do. Just think of the
uncompromised sections of the Church -- even there our stance is most
emphatically defensive. We think we have won, for example, if we
successfully prevent them from establishing homosexual marriage in our
state. But that, while good, is not victory at all. You haven't won the
war simply because your city makes it another day without collapsing
because of the siege.
Takeaway point: We should look for a way to stop responding to
initiatives of the adversary, and start behaving in such a way that they
have to figure out how to respond to us.
The third principle is concentration. Of course, concentration may be
employed on the tactical level, but let us consider concentration on
the strategic level, and not on the tactical level. Paul concentrated on
the key city of Ephesus for several years in his teaching in the hall
of Tyrannus, and all of Asia heard the word of the Lord. The Reformer
John Calvin concentrated his efforts in the (relatively) unimportant
city of Geneva, and the fact that the city was “taken” permitted hosts
of refugees from other places to concentrate there, and from there to
influence the continent of Europe. Preachers, books, general mayhem and
trouble were all exported.
But there are two ways to concentrate. One is seen in Wheaton and
Colorado Springs. This is where Christian organizations and outfits act
like birds of feather. It is essentially (of course with some
exceptions) a ghetto mentality. This is where you go when you want to be
able to meet lots of evangelicals. But these cities are not a hissing
and a byword in the unbelieving nation around, which they would be if
they were practicing the other kind of concentration.
Whenever believers successfully gather, we want to take special care
that we do not lapse into a ghetto mentality. The point is to make the
concentration here as potent as it was in Ephesus or Geneva. And that
means exporting the antithesis.
Takeaway point: Concentration is not to be pursued for the sake of a
respite; it is a concentration of force, applied in ways the adversary
wants you to stop. So don't stop.
The fourth principle of war is mobility. Our tendency is to look at a
principle like mobility, and immediately translate. But with this
principle, a confusion between principle and method is likely to happen.
For example, in the war of worldviews, in the clash of ideas, someone
is likely to immediately think of the Internet as an example of
mobility. And it can be. But it can also be a device which displays
one’s stodginess to the whole world at the speed of light. Mobility, as
far as we are concerned, is a state of mind.
Of course, in a physical
war mobility has a strong physical component. Either your enemy got
there first or you did. Either he was able to strike first, or you were
able to. But even here, the ability to move is the result of a certain
frame of mind. This frame of mind was evident in the time of
preparation, and it is evident at the moment of decision.
Mobility is
not demonstrated by itself. A man may be highly energetic, and have a
lot of stamina, but use it all by running around in tight little
circles. This principle is employed in concert with others. A panicked
army in a rout is mobile. A mad dash assaulting the wrong part of the
line may be mobile. Mobility is exercised when the right amount of force
gets to the right place quickly. A bullet fired in the wrong direction
goes just as fast.
I have said that mobility is a state of mind. Let me define this via negativa. Mobility is restricted by:
Laziness:
a lazy man is full of excuses, so he is likely to point to factors
outside himself which may fall in some of these other categories. But
nothing will be accomplished in any realm unless we learn to work like
Protestants used to.
Cowardice: fear of what might happen at the end
of the march often leads some folks to delay or cancel the march. Like
the lieutenent in Ambrose Bierce's small story, we are concerned that
any further display of valor on the part of our troops might bring us
into contact with the enemy.
Uncertainty: a man might be fully
willing to do the right thing if only he had epistemic certainty
concerning what it was. But he cannot have this. We have to walk by
faith.
Confusion: a man may have great confidence, but mobilize all
his resources to do the wrong thing at the wrong place. Or the right
thing at the wrong place. Or the wrong thing at the right place.
Complacency: a man might not do something because he believes that it is not necessary to do.
Takeaway
point: Mobility remembers that an army is supposed to fight, and it is
supposed to fight as quickly as effectively possible.
Then we come to
security. Security cannot be a stand alone principle. Guarding oneself
against the possibility of defeat is important, but prudent security is
not the same thing as “risk-free” warfare. A war in which there is no
possibility of things going wrong is not really a war.
We are to live up to what we have already attained, and we are not to
let it go. But, to mix the metaphor, this is not to be a talent buried
in the ground. This secured ground is to be used as the basis for our
attack on the enemy. Thus, security must always be married to
“offensive,” and be thought of as a means to that end.
We are to comport ourselves in such as way that the enemy is either
unaware that we are doing anything, or is unaware of what we are doing.
Security can be good because we are (still) marshaling our forces, and
the enemy does not know there is an enemy in the field. Or, security can
be good because we are not chatterboxes. If a pastor is invited into an
unbelieving forum should he (as a general rule) want to go? Sure. But
if he goes, he should talk like a football coach in a pregame interview.
He should say things like "we want to concentrate on moving the ball."
He should give absolutely nothing away that he does not want the enemy
to know and act upon.
Takeaway point: Keep your game plan to yourself, but not in a
furtive, guilty way. An intelligent adversary should know that there are
things you are up to that he knows nothing about.
The sixth principle is surprise. There are many ways to surprise an
enemy, but in our current culture wars, I would urge us to strive to
surprise the adversary in the following ways:
1. Treating their Revolution as the Establishment;
2. Cultivating a sunny Calvinism;
3. Nurturing all their virtues;
4. Stealing all their thunder;
5. And assuming the stance of an optimistic outsider.
They should constantly be having to put out yet another fire that you
started in some unexpected place. And each time should make them think,
"what next?," before they guess wrong.
Takeaway point: Effective surprise is frequently the result of an
effective use of some of the other principles combined (e.g. security
and mobility). You should want to make all their surprises unpleasant.
The seventh principle is cooperation. This is a principle that
receives a different emphasis here than in the book Principles of War.
In that book, the emphasis (quite good) was on what might be called
evangelical ecumenicism. As with so many other situations, our behavior
is directed by what kind of analogies we use.
For example, in that book,
it is obvious that competition between the Army and Navy is unspeakable
folly in the face of a common foe. But suppose it is not a matter of
two branches of the armed forces, but one of an army and a separated
band of mutineers? Now what should we do? Or suppose that a supported
regiment is commanded by a blockhead? Should a wise general depend on
him or try to work around him?
Many theological/doctrinal issues work into this. Should we cooperate
with evangelical Arminians? Should we cooperate with strict
regulativists? Should we cooperate with charismatics? The answer to the
question should be settled by whether or not Christ is cooperating with
them. Always remember the crucial distinction between fellowship and
leadership. We may cooperate with someone in worship, for example,
without having to maintain that he is the next John Knox.
Takeaway point: Strategic differences are not moral differences, but
they are still important to the issue of leadership and cooperation. You
can believe that someone ought not be a general without breaking
fellowship with him, or making it personal.
The next principle is communication. When the principle of
communication is being considered it is very important for us to
remember the headship of Jesus Christ over His body, the Church. The
right hand does not communicate with the left hand, but rather with the
head. When this happens, the right and left hand cooperate. When it does
not, the body functions (to that extent) in a spastic fashion.
God speaks to us in Scripture. We must have a high view of the
authority of the Word, and we must have a hermeneutic that does justice
to this view. With regard to the former, the classical Protestant view
of sola Scriptura is that the Bible is the only infallible and ultimate
rule for faith and practice. With regard to the latter, we must eschew
all forms of modernity (arrogant epistemology) and postmodernity
(arrogant skepticism).
We communicate with God in:
1. Corporate worship: Public worship is far more important that
private or family worship. The latter are crucial, but one of the main
blessings of them are found in the impact they have on public worship.
2. Private prayer: We are also instructed to pray without ceasing, be devoted to prayer, etc.
3. Communication horizontally: When close communication with God is
occurring, it is safe to maintain close ties with like-minded believers
elsewhere.
Takeaway point: Security and communication must be balanced.
Communication must be restricted enough that the adversary has no access
to it, and open enough that everyone who needs to know does know.
Then we come to economy of force. Armies fight and mobs fight. But a
mob has no notion of precision. Mobs try to kill an ant with a baseball
bat.
The key here is that we must be motivated by obedience, not by
personal vendettas or malice. Someone who hates may fight
enthusiastically, but necessarily without wisdom. We do not strike
because it is “fun” or simply because it would make the adversary mad.
In our culture wars, the unbelieving world is enormous. We must not
assume we must attack all along the front with everything we have. This
would neglect concentration, as well as deplete our resources, violating
economy of force. In other words, pick your battles carefully and then
use the force it takes at that point of battle. The point is not to
fight, the point is to fight and win that particular field. What will it
take to do that?
In addition, fighting everywhere, all the time, is likely to distort
God's redemptive intention for the world. As we look at the unbelieving
world, we should see it as that which the war is over, and not simply
who we are fighting with. This is a war of libertation. We are fighting
with slave-masters over their slaves.
Takeaway point: Economy of force means that we steer away from a
"shock and awe" approach. The point is to be effective, and not to show
off. The American military is not the first massively strong military to
think that such strength can be substituted for principled thinking.
And last, pursuit. Christians are peace-loving people, and this
sometimes gets them into trouble. Too often we drag a problem out, and
make the whole thing last ten times longer than it has to be. But when
the principle of pursuit is employed, it is clear that victory is the
objective.
As Agag thought: “Surely the time of bitterness is past.” But it
wasn't. We are not to fight to the point of predominance, we are to
fight to the point of complete victory.
Pursuit is the principle neglected by the currently strong. Many wars
have been prolonged because the victorious army did not press its
advantage in the immediate aftermath of a critical battle.
Takeaway point: The complete victory is not as close as it appears.
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