Will Marjah Be a Success?

Yes, and No

The new offence by Nato in Helmand province is grinding on. By all accounts it is slower than expected, but eventual success is almost assured. But what about this time next year? Herein lies the problem.

Paul Rogers, writing in Open Democracy, attempts to give a realistic assessment in an article entitled: Afghanistan: What It's Like.

Firstly, a summary of the present difficulties facing the operation:

The high-profile military campaign by International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) forces against Taliban militias in Afghanistan’s southern province of Helmand involves the deployment of some 15,000 heavily armed troops, who are supported by strike-aircraft, helicopter-gunships, artillery and armed drones - all ranged against perhaps 1,000 lightly armed insurgents. Despite this imbalance of power, Operation Moshtarak is already facing unanticipated difficulties.

The seizure of the main urban target, Marjah, has proved harder than expected for two quite different reasons. First, the incoming forces are discovering far greater numbers of deadly improvised-explosive devices (IEDs) than has been customary in past campaigns; in one case a contingent of United States marines took eight hours to move less than two kilometres because of the minute-by-minute need to locate and defuse IEDs. Second, in some areas where they feel more secure Taliban militias have offered strong resistance to US and Afghan army forces, often in house-to-house fighting. They have also made particularly effective use of sniper-fire, with militants often operating at long range (see CJ Chivers, “New Taliban weapon: snipers”, New York Times, 17 February 2010).

The second factor is notable in that many analysts had, drawing on earlier experience of such campaigns, expected the Taliban groups to retreat in the face of the massively superior firepower that United States forces could deploy. But there is abundant evidence of Taliban commanders being very quick to learn from changes in Isaf operating methods, and adapting their own tactics accordingly. In this respect three incidents on 13-15 February 2010 where Afghan civilians were killed in air-raids or shot in combat-zones - again part of a long-standing pattern - underline the limited use and often counterproductive effects of US air-assaults. Since the marines’ firepower advantage has begun to prove less reliable than expected, it looks very much as though the Taliban is more willing to offer direct opposition to foreign troops in and around Marjah.

None of this means that Operation Moshtarak will fail. There is every likelihood that the Taliban militias will soon withdraw from open conflict in the area, as they have already done further north. After all, Nato/Isaf’s great military superiority means that territorial gains are - at least in the short term - inevitable.

In Vietnam the inability of the US forces to occupy conquered territory indefinitely proved to be a major weakness. A victorious army must occupy and maintain command and control over territory for the long term. The US war manual in Afghanistan is that the Afghani army will take over this task, and large scale aid efforts will back them up--all designed to change the loyalties of tribesmen away from the Taliban to the Afghani government. How feasible or likely is this? The terrain and local realities mean that small (one hundred personnel) forward operating bases will need to be maintained to try to keep the Taliban in check going forward and protect the reconstruction efforts.

It turns out that forward operating bases have proved largely ineffective at controlling the Taliban once they have been "driven out" of an area. Only a small proportion of the personnel can be spared to maintain patrols. The Taliban have virtually unlimited freedom to re-group and operate an effective guerrilla war.

If the base seeks to maintain round-the-clock surveillance and cover a significant part of its (100 sq km) zone, then the very most that can be maintained is twelve troops on patrol at any one time. This means that each patrol-group is operating for the equivalent of eight hours a day (or night), seven days a week - fifty-six hours of arduous and dangerous active duty that even to the fittest of soldiers is hugely debilitating and even exhausting. It is a routine possible to sustain for long only via the rotation of fresh troops from the main base.

In practice, any given base-commander may choose to operate only day-time patrols over a large part of the area, with two groups out rather than one (perhaps further split into smaller units). That might cover a large area, but it also leaves the night free for insurgents to operate. It is true that bases will be aided by the use of reconnaissance drones and aircraft, airborne Sigint and Elint and satellite-based systems; but these have little effect without the work of the patrols.

There is every indication that the Taliban fighting in Marjah will just melt away, re-group, and wait to fight another day. The local population know that. They regard the national Afghani government as semi-foreign. Loyalties will likely remain intensely local.

The very size of Operation Moshtarak seems at first sight to make it more than enough to drive the Taliban out of central Helmand. The emerging reality is that the militants are adapting to the assault by melting into the surrounding communities, with a few engaging in direct combat, and that they are able to survive most of what is thrown at them. . . .

In any event, what happens after the peak of the assault matters more than its immediate, local details - and that will become apparent only over many months and even years. The fighting around Marjah is being intensively reported in the western media . . . . There will be much less attention on the aftermath of Operation Moshtarak - yet, . . . it is precisely when the media caravan has moved on that the deeper realities of the Afghanistan war are revealed.