Friday 19 September 2014

Prisoners and the Vote

Sensible Sentencing

A career criminal and (now) jail-house lawyer is taking a case to the High Court attempting to overturn legislation which denies prisoners the vote.  The case has been inspired by the European Court of Human Rights which has infamously ruled that denial of suffrage to prisoners violates their human rights.  New Zealand's own Bill of Rights--a piece of statutory law--declares voting to be a, you guessed it, human right.

The argument being made amounts to question-begging of the highest order.  Point One: denial of suffrage to prisoners is a prima facie violation of the NZ Human Rights Act.  Point Two: denial of suffrage is cruel and unusual punishment, since it does not contribute in any meaningful way to the rehabilitation of prisoners. Point Three: the European Court of Human Rights ruling is a fantastic precedent, which has all sorts of implications for antediluvians in the Antipodes.

The question begged is this: does incarceration represent any removal or diminution or denial of any human rights--declared and ostensibly protected in the NZ Human Rights Act--at all?  One would imagine so.  Being told when to rise, when to comply with "lights out", when to eat, what to wear, where to go, where not to go, and how to conduct oneself at all times, with retributive punishment for non-compliance, violates just about every freedom right imaginable.  So, if the argument that denial of suffrage for prisoners amounts to a breach of the NZ Human Rights Act is deemed correct, all incarceration of convicted criminals must also breach that Act. But if incarceration of prisoners in this country does not breach the NZ Human Rights Act, then neither can withdrawing suffrage from them. 

We are aware that some folk philosophically oppose retributive punishment of any kind for criminals.
  They believe it dehumanises them, making them worse.  We are aware that our present system of dealing with criminals is based upon balancing three principles (punishment, protection of the public, and rehabilitation) which in many instances are in conflict with each other, and none of which are ever fully satisfied.  Removal of suffrage rights is a punishment, a retributive consequence of criminal acts, of the same order as incarceration. As such it is not a violation of the NZ Human Rights Act at all.

An opinion writer in the Waikato Times put the matter in focus for everyone endowed with even the smallest modicum of common sense:
News had also just broken that the criminal Arthur Taylor was fighting for prisoners' rights to vote in the High Court. . . .(H)ere is a man who has broken the law 150 times appealing to the law for the opportunity to choose the lawmakers. It's like a comedy. Why on earth does he care who makes laws? If his past is anything to go by he won't be a huge fan of keeping the laws his chosen politicians make anyway.

That, really, is the core problem he has, poor bloke. An argument about rights always sounds so soulless when one refuses to uphold the responsibilities that go with them. Arthur wants cake when he has already eaten it.

The very simple way for him to have the right to vote would be to stay out of jail. Then he could vote to his heart's content. No-one would get in the way of his "fundamental freedoms", by virtue of the fact he wasn't getting in the way of theirs. After all, that is what committing a crime boils down to; stealing rights from our fellow citizens. We steal their right to life when we murder; we steal their right to own property when we take things not lawfully ours; we steal their right to the truth when we commit fraud. Having stolen the rights of his fellow citizens, Arthur wants more. That's just greedy. If he was appealing his multitude of convictions, I would understand. A man or woman should always have the right to fight to clear their name. But once they are convicted, and all the dust has settled, there has to be some way to make things right for the victim. Quite understandably, that means removing or restricting the "fundamental freedoms" they once abused to commit their crimes.

Yes, that even includes the fellow inmates Arthur refers to who have children on the outside, and whose hearts now yearn to have a say on educational policy. They should have been thinking about the welfare of their children when they were deciding whether or not to commit crimes, because I'm sure having a mum and dad there for you is more important than how your teachers get paid.
We are not great fans of incarceration. We do believe, however, that all criminal acts have consequences that have to be faced up to and dealt with.  We believe in restorative justice and restitution.  We do not believe it should be regarded as a soft-option if properly done.  We also believe that it contributes most effectively to rehabilitation.  But then there are the career criminals--folk who have been through all the restorative options, but have returned once again to preying upon others.  For them, rehabilitation and restitution is ebbing away, if not already long gone.  We also believe that certain crimes are capital in nature--so evil and egregiously extreme--that restitution and rehabilitation have nothing to contribute and ought to play no part.  We believe this is the Christian position on the matter.

In the meantime, we believe that incarceration should protect the community, whilst providing every opportunity for restorative justice and restitution.  We believe strongly in educational and skill-development programmes for willing prisoners.  We believe strongly in treating prisoners with respect and dignity.  But none of this removes the retributive aspect of incarceration.  Losing the right to vote is just one aspect of retribution to enable prisoners to face up to the consequences of their evil-doing. 


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