The Justification of Knowledge and Truth, Part III

 Adding Zeroes to Zero

Unbelief has strained over the years to find a suitable and adequate justification for knowledge--the problem of knowing that what we know is true knowledge or truth.  Unbelieving thought--that is, philosophies which reject from the outset the existence of the Living God, His self-revelation in Nature, and the Scriptures--have struggled to find an adequate foundation for truth.  Every rational proposal collapses at some point into irrationalism.

We have seen this to be the case in two leading tendencies attempting to justify knowledge: rationalism and empiricism (see here, and here.)  The third tendency is subjectivism.  This offers the principle that all knowledge and truth is ultimately self-justified by the subject--that is, we who know.  Now there is a lot to commend subjectivism, as opposed to rationalism and empiricism at first blush.  In the first place, logical argument (the champion of the rationalists) often fails to convince.  John Frame describes the problem:

. . . you can have an argument that is logically valid (the premises imply the conclusion) and sound (the premises are true) that does not persuade the person you are arguing with.  In that case, although you have a valid and sound argument, in one sense you have not "proved" your case.  Proof, or persuasion, depends on many subtle personal factors that are difficult, if not impossible, to formulate in a general epistemology. [John Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Nutley: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1987), p.119.]

Anyone who has ever "fallen in love" will acknowledge that there can be a certainty which transcends valid and sound argument--a certainty that will lead one to make a life-long covenantal commitment to another and one where valid and sound syllogisms don't just fail to convince, they appear irrelevant.    As the Proverb has it, who can understand the way of a man and a maid?  [Proverbs 30: 19]  But less dramatically this is also the case in many (if not the majority of) circumstances.  Most times when we change our mind or our position it is not the result of carefully working through valid and sound reasons.  What leads us to be persuaded of a new proposition or a new position?

Logical reasoning is one, but what makes the logical reasoning persuasive to me?  Sense-experience is another, but what makes me accept one interpretation of sense-experience in preference to a different one?  Religious presuppositions, group loyalties, aesthetic tastes, social-economic and racial biases--any number of good or bad factors can influence the process of persuasion.

Thus it seems that in the final analysis, knowledge-claims are psychological states, and each of us evaluates those claims by a wide range of highly personal, individual criteria.  There is no "objective" truth, truth that is publicly accessible by universally accepted criteria; there is only truth "for" the individual.  Therefore there is no knowledge of an objective truth, only knowledge of my own experience that is based on my own internal criteria.  [Frame, ibid., p. 120.]

Thus, subjectivism has much to commend it as a foundation for knowledge--much to the chagrin of the rationalist and the empiricist.  But subjectivism ends up hoist on its own petard. 

1. It cannot be argued.  As soon as the subjectivist attempts to convince another of his position, he presupposes that truth claims can be shared and jointly acknowledged.  He is claiming to know (and prove) objectively that there is no objective truth--which is a nonsensical position.  If it can be argued, it cannot be true.

2. Faced with this fatal objection, many subjectivists retreat from a grand claim about subjectivism to a personalistic one: subjectivism is not true for everyone, but only for oneself.

If the subjectivist stops at red lights and seeks to avoid eating poisonous materials, we may conclude that he is really an objectivist at heart.  On the other hand, if the subjectivist is willing to live without any objective constraints at all, then he is insane and there is not much we can say to him, except to bear witness.  [Ibid., p. 120] 

 Of course most thinkers--aware of some of the limitations of their rationalist, empiricist, or subjectivist positions--seek to combine one or more elements of the other alternatives in an attempt to get the "best of all possibilities".  All that results are further complication, confusion and  internal contradictions--leading in the end to radical scepticsm, at least if one has the courage for such a position.  (Recall how Kant was frightened by Hume's scepticism, which provoked him to think of a way of escaping such devastating scepticism, albeit without success.)  No matter how many zeroes one adds to zero, the outcome does not change.

All these Unbelieving attempts to justify knowledge fail; they cannot escape the finitude of man, a finite creature, afterall.  The rationalist can imagine premises and can apply the "laws of logic" to them, but has no way to validate the premises as sound; he cannot escape Plato's cave.  The empiricist can test by sensual observation, but everything--including some things vital and important--is not subject to confirmation by the senses.  The subjectivist can neither argue nor persuade others of subjectivism without contradicting his position.

Human knowledge can be justified only if we presuppose the living infinite, personal God, Who created all things out of nothing and who sustains everything exhaustively.  The contrary is impossible to know justifiably.